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LOCKED UP, SHUT UP: WHY SPEECH IN 
PRISON MATTERS 
EVAN BIANCHI† & DAVID SHAPIRO†
INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 18, 2017, Michael D. Williams, an Alabama 
prisoner, received notice from Holman Correctional Facility that 
his mail had been rejected.1  The prison was blocking his receipt 
of the San Francisco Bay View, a 40-year-old national black 
newspaper covering political and cultural issues in the Bay Area 
and beyond.2  The newspaper publishes articles and op-eds on 
topics such as the childcare crisis,3 the need for multi-unit 
smoke-free housing policies,4 net neutrality and free speech,5 and 
police response to crimes involving black victims.6  Writings by 
prisoners are often featured in the publication as well.7
 
† Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 
The authors are grateful to Andrew Koppelman, Robert Owen, Heather Schoenfeld, 
and the St. John’s Law Review Editorial Board for their helpful feedback on drafts. 
 
† Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, and 
Director of Appellate Litigation, Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center. 
1 Michael D. Williams, Alabama’s Holman Prison Bans the Bay View for Being 
‘Racially Motivated,’ Subscriber Declares Hunger Strike, S.F. BAY VIEW (Mar. 26, 
2017), http://sfbayview.com/2017/03/Alabamas-Holman-Prison-bans-the-Bay-View-fo 
r-being-racially-motivated-subscriber-declares-hunger-strike/; see also Christopher 
Harress, Holman Prison Bans ‘Racially Motivated’ Newspaper, AL.COM (Mar. 27, 
2017), https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/03/holman_prison_bans_racially_mo. 
html. 
2 S.F. BAY VIEW, http://sfbayview.com (last visited June 22, 2018). 
3 Mary Ignatius, Parents Bring the Child Care Crisis to Sacramento at the 21st 
Annual Stand for Children Day, S.F. BAY VIEW (May 9, 2017), http://sfbayview.com 
/2017/05/Parents-bring-the-child-care-crisis-to-Sacramento-at-the-21st-annual-
Stand-for-Children-Day/. 
4 Marlene Christine Hurd, Why Oakland Needs a Multi-Unit Smoke Free 
Housing Policy, S.F. BAY VIEW (Apr. 29, 2017), http://sfbayview.com/2017/04/Why-
Oakland-needs-a-multi-unit-smoke-free-housing-policy/. 
5 Linda Kennedy, Net Neutrality: Protecting Your Right to Free Speech in the 
21st Century, S.F. BAY VIEW (May 2, 2017), http://sfbayview.com/2017/05/Net-
neutrality-Protecting-your-right-to-free-speech-in-the-21st-century/. 
6 Slauson Girl, Did Police and EMT Response Contribute to Humboldt State 
Student’s Death?, S.F. BAY VIEW (Apr. 27, 2017), http://sfbayview.com/2017/04/Did-
police-and-EMT-response-contribute-to-Humboldt-State-students-death/. 
7 See, e.g., Anthony Robinson, Why Isn’t ‘Prison Reform’ Seeking an Effective 
Demand for Change?, S.F. BAY VIEW (Mar. 26, 2017), http://sfbayview.com/2017/ 
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Why was Mr. Williams barred from receiving the San 
Francisco Bay View?  On the rejection notification, prison 
officials stated that the newspaper was banned because it was 
“racially motivated.”8  Nothing more.  Holman Correctional 
Facility was not the only prison to prohibit prisoners from 
receiving the newspaper.9  Texas and Pennsylvania banned the 
newspaper in prisons statewide, and the editor of the newspaper 
received letters from prisoners in Louisiana, Indiana, California, 
and Illinois claiming that they had been denied the publication 
as well.10





03/Why-isnt-prison-reform-seeking-an-effective-demand-for-change/ (opinion piece 
written about prison reform by a prisoner in California). 
  To our surprise, however, the academic literature has 
yet to provide a full account of why speech in prison matters from 
a First Amendment standpoint.  Previous scholarship has argued 
that American courts offer little protection to the expressive 
freedoms of incarcerated men and women because judges defer  
 
8 Williams, supra note 1. 
9 See Kamala Kelkar, From Media Cutoffs to Lockdown, Tracing the Fallout 
from the U.S. Prison Strike, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/nation/prison-strike-lockdown-fallout. 
10 Id. 
11 See David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in Fact: Prison, Speech, and 
Scrutiny, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 988–1005 (2016). Though restrictions on 
incoming speech are only one aspect in which prisoners’ speech is limited, see infra 
Section I.B, book bans illustrate the stark arbitrariness of speech regulations in 
prisons. Prisoners in Texas can obtain copies of Mein Kampf, but Michelle 
Alexander’s monograph, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness, was prohibited in North Carolina and New Jersey until earlier this 
year because it was “likely to provoke confrontation between racial groups.” Jonah 
Engel Bromwich, Why Are American Prisons So Afraid of This Book?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Bromwich, Why Are American Prisons So Afraid of This 
Book?], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/new-jim-crow-book-ban-prison.html; 
see also Matthew Haag, Texas Prisons Ban 10,000 Books. No ‘Charlie Brown 
Christmas’ for Inmates., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/07/us/banned-books-texas-prisons.html. North Carolina and New Jersey 
have since lifted the ban on the book after receiving complaints from the American 
Civil Liberties Union. Jonah Engel Bromwich, North Carolina Prisons Drop Ban on 
‘New Jim Crow’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24 
/us/new-jim-crow-north-carolina.html. The New Jim Crow is still prohibited in 
Florida, where the ban was apparently instituted because the prison system’s 
literature review determined that the book was filled with “racial overtures.” 
Bromwich, Why Are American Prisons So Afraid of This Book?, supra. 
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obsequiously to the censorship decisions of prison officials.12
Prison speech is important under the free expression 
rationales that figure most prominently in Supreme Court case 
law—the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, the 
checking value of free speech, and self-fulfillment.  The 
marketplace of ideas does not function properly when the 
government impedes prisoners from participating in public 
discourse, especially with regard to criminal justice and mass 
incarceration matters.  Under the democracy legitimation theory, 
unrestrained prison censorship excludes prisoners’ voices from 
the discussion of political and public issues that is central to 
facilitating democratic decision-making.  As for the checking 
value of free speech, discourse cannot restrain the power of 
prison officials if those very officials have the authority to keep 
complaints about their conduct and prison conditions from ever 
leaving the prison’s walls.  And prison censorship surely 
compromises self-fulfillment; as Justice Thurgood Marshall 
wrote:  “When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does 
not lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to 
ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a free and open 
interchange of opinions . . . .”
  This 
article addresses an antecedent question:  Why does speech in 
prison matter in the first place, if at all? 
13
The rise of mass incarceration in the United States 
heightens the importance of protecting free speech in prison.  The 
unprecedented scale of incarceration in America—where some 
2.2 million people reside in prisons and jails—leaves more people 
  For purposes of this article, we 
remain agnostic as to which of the prominent free expression 
theories provides the best justification for valuing prisoner 
speech.  Prison speech matters under each of them. 
 
12 Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, discusses how the Supreme Court has 
treated prisons when it comes to protection of individual rights, showing that 
judicial oversight is most needed over such institutions. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 441–42 
(1999). Sharon Dolovich explores the Court’s unprincipled stance of deference in 
prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 
24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 245 (2012). Scott Moss argues for the application of 
intermediate scrutiny in the context of prisons. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers 
and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring 
of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1678–79 (2007). Many others 
have commented on and critiqued Turner’s reasonableness standard. For a list of 
prior literature, see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 976 n.20. 
13 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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than ever before at the mercy of speech restrictions.14  Because 
poor people and people of color face disproportionate rates of 
incarceration, prison censorship affects these groups with the 
greatest force, reducing their power to participate in the public 
forum.15  As the issue of mass incarceration has assumed greater 
prominence in social discourse—with everyone from Hillary 
Clinton to Newt Gingrich calling for sentencing reform—prison 
censorship has the perverse ability to exclude the voices of 
incarcerated men and women from debates about incarceration 
itself.16
Prison speech may be divided into four categories: (1) pure 
incoming speech, such as a letter sent by a non-prisoner to a 
prisoner; (2) pure outgoing speech, such as a letter sent by a 
prisoner to a non-prisoner; (3) mixed incoming/outgoing speech, 
such as a real-time conversation between a prisoner and a non-
prisoner during a visit or telephone call; and (4) pure internal 
speech, such as a conversation between two prisoners.  At first 
blush, it might seem that theories of free speech focused on 
public discourse—such as the marketplace of ideas and 
democracy legitimation—should be concerned only with pure 
outgoing speech and mixed incoming/outgoing speech.  After all, 
pure incoming speech is directed into the prison and pure 
internal speech occurs within the prison; neither enters the 
public discourse.  Nevertheless, the breadth of ideas and 
information that prisoners can receive—from those outside 
prison walls and from other prisoners—ultimately affects their 




14 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2018), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-
Corrections.pdf. 
  Therefore, 
greater protection for pure outgoing speech and mixed 
incoming/outgoing speech would only partly solve the problems 
created by excessive judicial deference to prison censorship.  To  
 
 
15 See infra Section III.A. 
16 Michelle Mark, Where Hillary Clinton Stands on Criminal Justice, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/where-hillary-clinton-stands-
on-criminal-justice-2016-10; Newt Gingrich & Van Jones, Prison System Is Failing 
America, CNN (May 22, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/opinion/gingrich-
jones-Prison-system-fails-America/index.html. 
17 See infra Section I.C. 
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enable prisoners to function as full participants in public 
discourse, the law must protect not only their ability to 
disseminate speech, but also their ability to receive it. 
Our ultimate conclusion—that prison speech matters—
suggests that the current legal standard that governs prisoners’ 
First Amendment claims, the legitimate penological interest test 
established by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, is 
inadequate.  The Turner standard requires a high level of judicial 
deference to prison officials’ censorship decisions, leaving 
prisoners’ speech with less protection than it merits. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I describes the 
deferential Turner standard that governs First Amendment 
claims brought by prisoners.  Virtually every word uttered or 
written to a prisoner and virtually every word uttered or written 
by a prisoner receives extremely limited legal protection.  Largely 
as a result of this legal regime, senseless censorship is all too 
common in American prisons.  Jailers and prison officials seem to 
have received the message that they can ban speech with 
impunity. 
Part II argues that the combination of Turner deference and 
mass incarceration divests prisoners of expressive power, thereby 
distorting public discourse.  Not only do people in American 
prisons and jails comprise a significant portion of the 
population—some 2.2 million men and women—but the people 
locked up are poorer, blacker, and browner than the population 
at large.  The combination of mass incarceration and prison 
censorship skews public debate in favor of wealthier, whiter, non-
incarcerated participants.  The same combination prevents some 
of the most relevant speakers from engaging in public discourse 
on prison-related topics such as solitary confinement and mass 
incarceration: prisoners themselves. 
Part III demonstrates that under the leading theories of free 
expression, prison speech matters.  It matters from the 
standpoint of the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, 
the checking value of free speech, and self-fulfillment.  Under all 
of these theories, prison speech is of consequence and deserves 
more protection than it now receives. 
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I. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE 
When it comes to judicial review of prison censorship, 
deference to prison officials is the order of the day.  The Supreme 
Court established a deferential standard for prison speech 
restrictions in Turner v. Safley, and several lower court decisions 
take such deference to great extremes.18  The Turner standard 
applies to virtually all categories of speech that a prisoner 
creates, transmits, and receives.  This includes: all speech from 
outsiders, such as incoming letters and publications; all real-time 
communication with outsiders, such as a visits and phone calls; 
and all communication between two prisoners or between a 
prisoner and a corrections official.19
A. Deference Under Turner 
  The one category potentially 
exempted from deference under Turner is “pure outgoing speech,” 
meaning one-way communications directed from a prisoner to an 
outsider. 
The dominant legal standard for evaluating prisoner speech 
is the legitimate penological interest test established by the 
Supreme Court in Turner,20 described as “the most important 
and widely used legal standard for evaluating prisoners’ rights 
claims.”21  Courts have cited the test in decisions more than 8,000 
times.22  Turner’s legitimate penological interest test posits that 
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”23
 
18 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987); see infra note 36 and 
accompanying text. 
  Four inquiries inform this 
analysis: (1) whether there is a “ ‘valid, rational connection’ 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental 
interest”; (2) “whether there are alternative means” for prisoners 
to exercise constitutional rights; (3) “the impact accommodation 
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and 
19 See infra Section I.B. 
20 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
21 Christopher E. Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 493 (2009). 
22 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 975. 
23 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added). 
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(4) the presence or “absence of ready alternatives.”24  The first of 
these prongs—the existence of a valid rational connection—is the 
crux of the standard and is often dispositive.25
Turner and its progeny require courts to accord great 
deference to the judgment of prison officials in assessing whether 
there is a rational connection between a speech restriction and a 
valid penological interest.
 
26  The standard reflects the view that 
“prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the 
difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.”27  For 
example, prison officials in Turner prohibited correspondence 
between prisoners at different facilities because the officials 
believed that such correspondence “facilitate[d] the development 
of informal organizations that threaten the core functions of 
prison administration, maintaining safety and internal 
security.”28  The Court held that “the choice made by corrections 
officials—which is, after all, a judgment ‘peculiarly within [their] 
province and professional expertise’—should not be lightly set 
aside by the courts.”29
[W]e have been sensitive to the delicate balance that prison 
administrators must strike between the order and security of 
the internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of 
those on the “outside” who seek to enter that environment, in 
person or through the written word . . . .  Acknowledging the 
expertise of these officials and that the judiciary is “ill 
equipped” to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of 
prison management, this Court has afforded considerable 
deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, 
in the interest of security, regulate the relations between 
prisoners and the outside world.
  In Thornburgh v. Abbott, the Supreme 




24 Id. at 89–90. 
 
25 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 982 & n.54. 
26 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–08 (1989); Turner, 482 U.S. 
at 89. 
27 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (alterations in original) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ 
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). 
28 Id. at 92. 
29 Id. at 92–93 (alteration in original) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 
827 (1974)). 
30 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407–08. 
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Indeed, Turner itself marked the only time that the Supreme 
Court invalidated a prison restriction that it analyzed under the 
Turner standard—a ban on inmate marriage.31  The Supreme 
Court, applying Turner, has consistently upheld prison 
regulations restricting a range of expressive activities, including 
accessing publications, meeting with visitors, and engaging in 
religious worship.32
Lower courts have taken Turner deference to even greater 
extremes, giving prison speech restrictions far more deference 
than required under Turner.
 
33  Prisoners who challenge speech 
restrictions confront “the often vast deference accorded to prison 
officials and the steep, uphill battle that inmates must surmount 
when fighting for their First Amendment rights to access 
magazines, movies, music, and other popular forms of media 
materials.”34  Examples of senseless restrictions upheld by 
federal courts of appeals include a prohibition on all newspapers 
and magazines, a rejection of a book about the treatment of 
women in prison, and a refusal to deliver the Physician’s Desk 
Reference.35
Prison officials appear to have received the message that 
they enjoy “practical immunity” from First Amendment lawsuits 
by prisoners due to a combination of Turner deference, other 
legal obstacles that stand in the way of successful prisoner 
actions (such as administrative exhaustion under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act), and non-legal impediments (such as 
limited education, poverty, and the difficulty of obtaining 
counsel).
 
36  The prison censors carry on with impunity.37  As one 
of us has argued previously and at greater length, “anything 
goes” seems to be the attitude of prison officials, who have been 
liberated from serious judicial oversight.38
 
31 Turner, 482 U.S. at 97–99. 
  Prison officials have 
32 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 
131 (2003); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408–13; O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 349–50 (1987). 
33 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1026. 
34 Clay Calvert & Kara Carnley Murrhee, Big Censorship in the Big House—A 
Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: Muting Movies, Music & Books Behind Bars, 
7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 257, 269 (2012). 
35 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 988–94. 
36 See id. at 1012–19. 
37 Id. at 995–1005. 
38 See id. at 1027. 
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done “everything from prohibiting President Obama’s book as a 
national security threat; to using hobby knives to excise Bible 
passages from letters; to forbidding all nonreligious publications; 
to banning Ulysses, John Updike, Maimonides, case law, and cat 
pictures.”39
B. Speech Subject to Turner Deference 
 
To understand the breadth of communication governed by 
Turner’s deferential standard, it is helpful to divide prisoners’ 
speech into four major categories based on where the speech 
originates and where it is directed.  We refer to these categories 
as pure incoming speech, pure outgoing speech, mixed 
incoming/outgoing speech, and internal speech.  The chart on the 
next page summarizes this taxonomy, and the text that follows 
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1. Pure Incoming Speech: Turner Deference 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, the Turner standard clearly applies to pure incoming 
speech, such as publications sent to prisoners.40
2. Pure Outgoing Speech: Standard Varies by Circuit 
 
While the issue is not free from debate, the best reading of 
Supreme Court case law is that a more searching standard of 
judicial review applies to prisoners’ pure outgoing speech under 
Procunier v. Martinez,41 a decision that predates Turner.  In 
Martinez, which concerned a challenge to prison rules that 
censored outgoing prisoner mail, the Court applied the following 
test: (1) “the regulation or practice in question must further an 
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression”; and (2) “the limitation of First 
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or 
essential to the protection of the particular governmental 
interest involved.”42  This standard, which requires both an 
important or substantial interest and tailoring between a speech 
restriction and the governmental interest, demands greater 
scrutiny than the Turner standard, which requires only a 
legitimate interest and a rational connection.  In Thornburgh, 
however, the Supreme Court declined to apply the Martinez 
standard to incoming publications, noting the greater 
“implications of incoming materials” for “prison security.”43
In our view, Thornburgh’s focus on the distinction between 
incoming and outgoing speech shows that the Court intended to 
limit the Martinez standard to outgoing speech, not to reject the 




40 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–08 (1989). 
  But the circuits 
are split on this question.  For example, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that Thornburgh overrules Martinez completely and that  
 
41 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
42 Id. at 413 (emphasis omitted). 
43 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. 
44  JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION 
MANUAL 188 nn.67–68 (4th ed. 2010); David M. Shapiro, The Cutting Edge of Prison 
Litigation, 1 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 95, 97–98 (2017). 
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the deferential Turner standard applies to all prisoner speech.45  
Other circuits hold that the more searching Martinez standard 
continues to apply to pure outgoing speech.46
3. Mixed Incoming/Outgoing Speech: Turner Deference 
 
Mixed incoming/outgoing speech consists of two-way 
communications between a prisoner and an outsider that occur in 
real-time.  The primary examples are phone calls and in-person 
visits.  In these exchanges, the prisoner is directing 
communications out of the prison, and the outsider is directing 
communications into the prison.  The deferential Turner 
standard governs mixed incoming/outgoing speech.  Thus, in 
Overton v. Bazetta, the Supreme Court applied the Turner 
standard to restrictions on visits, which involve speech 
exchanged between prisoners and outsiders.47  Lower courts have 
similarly applied Turner when deciding whether restrictions on 
the number of people prisoners are allowed to call violate the 
First Amendment.48
4. Pure Internal Speech: Turner Deference 
 
While the Supreme Court has not considered a case 
involving purely internal speech, the rationale for Turner 
deference—the maintenance of internal prison order49
 
45 See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 214–15 (5th Cir. 
2012); Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678–79 (5th Cir. 2009). 
—certainly 




46 See, e.g., Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2006); Nasir v. 
Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2003); Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 838 (6th Cir. 1996); Witherow v. Paff, 
52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995); Stow v. Grimaldi, 993 F.2d 1002, 1003–04 (1st Cir. 
1993).  
47 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133–36 (2003). 
48 Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Consideration of 
the Turner factors demonstrates that the ten-person telephone calling list imposed 
at Donaldson bears a reasonable relation to legitimate penological objectives.”); 
Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[b]ased 
on the wide deference given prison officials under recent Supreme Court 
decisions . . . internal security and rehabilitation concerns” justified a three-person 
telephone calling list). 
49 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). 
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the Supreme Court has extended the Turner standard to Free 
Exercise cases in which prisoners challenge restrictions of 
religious freedom that occur entirely within prison walls.50
* * * 
 
In sum, if one envisions speech in prison as a territorial map, 
the Martinez standard occupies a small island surrounded by a 
sea of Turner deference.  Turner applies to internal speech, 
incoming speech, and mixed incoming/outgoing speech.  These 
categories of speech encompass everything that a prisoner says to 
another prisoner or a prison staff member, every word that 
enters a prison by mail, and every word exchanged by a prisoner 
and a non-prisoner in a visit, phone call, or interview.  The more 
exacting Martinez standard is limited to pure outgoing speech, 
such as letters sent by prisoners, and even that exception to 
Turner deference varies by circuit.51
C. Degradation of Pure Outgoing Speech 
 
Even in the circuits that apply the more exacting Martinez 
standard to pure outgoing speech, the very limited protection 
that Turner affords to internal speech, incoming speech, and 
mixed incoming-outgoing speech threatens pure outgoing speech 
indirectly.  The receipt of speech is critical to the production of 
speech.  Generally, in addition to the constitutional right of a 
sender to have her communication delivered to the recipient, a 
recipient has a constitutional right to receive a sender’s 
communication.52
 
50 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352–53 (1987) (upholding 
restrictions on attending a weekly Muslim congregational service). 
  Without the ability to receive, people have 
fewer ideas, sources, and information at their disposal when 
creating their own speech.  As the Supreme Court has held, 
“access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to 
exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful 
51 See Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678–79 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Delo, 
995 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1993); Shapiro, supra note 44, at 97–98. 
52 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (“[T]he Constitution protects 
the right to receive information and ideas.”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969) (“This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their 
social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” (citation omitted)); Susan Nevelow 
Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 175 (2003) (“Although 
the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to free speech, if you 
can’t get access to the speech, the value of the guarantee diminishes.”). 
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manner.”53  Indeed, “without freedom to acquire information, the 
right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.”54  As Jack 
Balkin has written, “[f]reedom of speech is part of an interactive 
cycle of social exchange, social participation, and self-formation.  
We speak and we listen, we send out and we take in. . . .  [A]nd 
we make something new out of what existed before.”55
In short, restrictions on input affect output.
  The 
corollary of prohibiting incoming information is the creation of 
speech that is less informed and less meaningful. 
56  The fact that 
the more searching Martinez standard applies to pure outgoing 
speech in some circuits does not protect such speech, even in 
those circuits, from the effects of Turner deference.  Turner 
deference envelops, directly and indirectly, nearly all prisoner 
speech.  It applies to every word that enters a prison, every word 
within a prison, and, in some circuits, every word that leaves a 
prison.57
II. MASS INCARCERATION AS MARKETPLACE DISTORTION 
  And even where Turner does not apply directly to pure 
outgoing speech, it threatens the production of speech by 
curtailing the consumption of speech. 
Turner deference encompasses not only a large swath of 
speech, but also a large segment of the population.  With the 
United States locking up 2.2 million people—more people than 
any other nation on earth—incarcerated men and women make 
up a substantial portion of the body politic.58
 
53 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982). The Supreme Court’s 
precedents have focused on the First Amendment’s role “in affording the public 
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.” Id. at 
866 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
  The Turner 
standard allows the government to censor this portion of the 
population much more severely than it can censor the population 
at large. 
54 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972). 
55 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2004). 
56 Thomas Emerson argued that the freedom of expression includes “the right of 
the individual to access . . . knowledge; to shape his own views; to communicate his 
needs, preference and judgments; in short, to participate in formulating the aims 
and achievements of his society and his state.” Thomas Emerson, Toward a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 880 (1963) (emphasis added). 
57 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 988−95. 
58 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14. 
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Prison censorship harms the marketplace of ideas in at least 
two ways.  Not only does it result in a general diminution of 
speech and viewpoint variety in the public sphere, it also skews 
the overall composition of public discourse by allowing 
prisoners—a group disproportionately composed of people of 
color—to be subjected to sweeping speech restrictions.  The 
prison population is not racially representative of the population 
as a whole, and because race often correlates with views on 
various matters of public concern, silencing prisoners threatens 
to distort public discourse by muffling particular viewpoints.59
In the United States, African Americans are incarcerated at 
five times the rate of whites.
  
60  The rate for Latinos is 1.4 times 
the rate of whites.61  Men make up the vast majority of the prison 
population,62 and young men of color are much more likely to be 
incarcerated than young white men.63  Poverty and lower rates of 
educational attainment, factors that disproportionately affect 
people of color—and that often are intertwined—also increase the 
chances of being incarcerated.64
 
59 See infra Section III.B. 
 
60 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL 
AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org 
/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/; see 
JENNIFER TURNER & JAMIL DAKWAR, ACLU, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING 1 
(2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparitie 
s_aclu_submission_0.pdf. 
61 NELLIS, supra note 60. 
62 DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 14 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf. 
63 Peter Wagner, Incarceration Is Not an Equal Opportunity Punishment, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/articles/notequal.html (last 
updated Aug. 28, 2012). 
64 See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon et al., Patterns and Trends in Racial/Ethnic and 
Socioeconomic Academic Achievement Gaps, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN 
EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 491 (Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d 
ed. 2015); Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: 
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 
183 (2004); Bernadette Rauby & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-
Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html. This is not to mention the 
devastating effects that imprisonment has on individuals and communities of color 
more generally. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass 
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272–73 
(2004); PAUL SAMUELS & DEBBIE MUKAMAL, LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: 
ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE 
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In aggregate terms, people of color who are incarcerated 
have different views on many matters of public concern than 
people who are white and free, especially when it comes to 
criminal justice.  Curtailing prisoners’ ability to participate in 
public discourse—the combined result of locking up millions of 
people and failing to safeguard their expressive freedom—
translates into viewpoint distortion.  The threat of distortion 
looms especially large in the present because mass incarceration 
and criminal justice reform have become focal points of public 
debate.65  According to the Sentencing Project, “[w]hite 
Americans are more punitive than people of color.”66  Thus, 
“while the majority of whites supported the death penalty for 
someone convicted of murder in 2013, half of Hispanics and a 
majority of blacks opposed this punishment.”67  Similar 
differences of opinion exist over sentencing practices, the 
principal driver of mass incarceration: “Compared to blacks, 
whites are also more likely to support ‘three strikes and you’re 
out’ laws, to describe the courts as not harsh enough, and to 
endorse trying youth as adults.”68
Americans also split along racial lines in their attitudes 
toward policing.  In 2016, the Pew Research Center reported 
that: 
 
Only about a third of blacks but roughly three-quarters of 
whites say police in their communities do an excellent or good 
job in using the appropriate force on suspects, treating all racial 
and ethnic minorities equally and holding officers accountable 
when misconduct occurs.  Roughly half of all blacks say local 
police do an excellent or good job combating crime—a view held 





WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 9 (2004), http://lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/ 
lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf. 
65 See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
66 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF 
CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 3 (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Race-and-Punishment.pdf. 
67 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 RICH MORIN & RENEE STEPLER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RACIAL 
CONFIDENCE GAP IN POLICE PERFORMANCE 2 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org 
/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/09/ST_2016.09.29_Police-Final.pdf. 
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When asked whether their local police departments use “the 
right amount of force for each situation,” 75% of whites, 62% of 
Hispanics, and 33% of blacks respond that the police are doing an 
excellent or good job.70  Similarly, Gallup polling data aggregated 
from 2014 to 2016 shows that 58% of whites but only 29% of 
blacks report having “a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in 
police.”71  The same polls indicated that 76% of African 
Americans but only 45% of whites believe that the criminal 
justice system is biased against African Americans.72
Opinion polling, however, does not capture the full cost of 
excluding prisoners from public discourse.  The loss lies not only 
in the potential distortion of how many people can be heard 
arguing for or against a given policy or proposition, but also in 
the silencing of important perspectives that only prisoners may 
have.  Consider the words of Robert King, who spent twenty-nine 
years in solitary confinement in Alabama, and Sarah Shourd, 
who endured a period of solitary confinement in Iran.  King 
writes: 
 
Some days I would pace up and down and from left to right for 
hours, counting to myself.  I learned to know every inch of the 
cell.  Maybe I looked crazy walking back and forth like some 
trapped animal, but I had no choice—I needed to feel in control 
of my space. 
 
At times I felt an anguish that is hard to put into words.  To live 
24/7 in a box, year after year, without the possibility of parole, 




After two months with next to no human contact, my mind 
began to slip.  Some days, I heard phantom footsteps coming 
down the hall.  I spent large portions of my days crouched down 
on all fours by a small slit in the door, listening.  In the 
periphery of my vision, I began to see flashing lights, only to 
 
70 Id. at 5. 
71 Frank Newport, Public Opinion Context: Americans, Race, and Police, 




73 Robert King, I Spent 29 Years in Solitary Confinement, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 
27, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/aug/28/29-years-solitary-
confinement-robert-king. 
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jerk my head around to find that nothing was there.  More than 
once, I beat at the walls until my knuckles bled and cried myself 
into a state of exhaustion.  At one point, I heard someone 
screaming, and it wasn’t until I felt the hands of one of the 
friendlier guards on my face, trying to revive me, that I realized 
the screams were my own.74
Firsthand accounts like King’s and Shourd’s enrich public 
discussion of solitary confinement, but we will never know what 
other voices have been silenced by the effects of Turner 
deference.  Prison censorship distorts and diminishes public 
discourse by excluding many of the people most affected by the 
criminal justice system from public discussion of the very issues 
that affect them.  This marketplace distortion likely affects 
public debates on mass incarceration, solitary confinement, 
private prisons, prison conditions, and life without parole 
sentences—all topics that have been matters of heightened public 








75 See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Even in Texas, Mass Imprisonment Is Going out of 
Style, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/opinion/even-
in-texas-mass-imprisonment-is-going-out-of-style.html?mcubz=3; Margaret Winter, 
Is This the Beginning of the End for Solitary Confinement in the United States?, 
ACLU (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/solitary-
confinement/beginning-end-solitary-confinement-united-states?redirect=blog/speak-
freely/beginning-end-solitary-confinement-united-states; Clint Smith, Why the U.S. 
Is Right to Move Away from Private Prisons, NEW YORKER (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-u-s-is-right-to-move-away-from-
private-prisons; Daniel Denvir, Private Prisons Are Not the Problem: Why Mass 
Incarceration Is the Real Issue, SALON (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.salon.com 
/2016/08/24/private-prisons-are-not-the-problem-why-mass-incarceration-is-the-real-
issue/; Jolie McCullough, Heat Is Part of Life at Texas Prisons, but Federal Judge 
Orders One To Cool It, TEX. TRIBUNE (July 20, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org 
/2017/07/20/texas-prison-heat-air-conditioning-lawsuit/; Rebecca Shaeffer, A British 
Court Rules That Sending Defendants to the U.S. Prison System Is a Human Rights 
Violation, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
democracy-post/wp/2018/02/07/a-british-court-rules-that-sending-defendants-to-the-
u-s-prison-system-is-a-human-rights-violation/?utm_term=.6ac26050f60f; Joe 
Fassler & Claire Brown, Prison Food is Making U.S. Inmates Disproportionately 
Sick, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive 
/2017/12/prison-food-sickness-america/549179/; Sarah Barr, Youth Advocates Using 
Documentary To Sway Public Opinion on JLWOP, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (July 
28, 2015), http://jjie.org/2015/07/28/youth-advocates-using-documentary-to-sway-
public-opinion-on-jlwop/; Madison Pauly, How Louisiana Tried and Failed to Stop 
Life Prison Sentences for Teens, MOTHER JONES (June 8, 2016), 
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III. PRISON SPEECH MATTERS 
We show in this section that prisoners’ speech matters under 
the free expression theories that have had the greatest influence 
on Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases—the 
marketplace of ideas, democratic legitimation, the checking value 
of free speech, and self-fulfillment. 
A. The Marketplace of Ideas 
The marketplace of ideas theory dates back to John Milton’s 
Areopagitica, written in 1644.76  John Stuart Mill presented a 
similar argument much later in On Liberty.77  The theory 
suggests that unfettered debate leads to the revelation of truth.  
According to this theory, censorship impedes the discovery of 
truth by suppressing free discussion.  The marketplace of ideas 
theory entered Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1919,78
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .  That at any rate 
is the theory of our Constitution.
 when 
Justice Holmes famously dissented in Abrams v. United States: 
79
The marketplace of ideas theory has been adopted in several 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions and continues to influence 







76 See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF 
UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), reprinted in 
AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER PROSE WORKS (Jim Miller ed., Dover Pubs., Inc. 2016). 
77 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in THE SIX GREAT 
HUMANISTIC ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 145 (3d prtg. 1970) (“He is capable of 
rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. 
There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong 
opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and 
arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it.”). 
78 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. 
80 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1984) (compiling a list of First 
Amendment cases in which the marketplace of ideas was present); Paul H. Brietzke, 
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Turner deference allows prison censorship that curtails 
prisoners’ participation in the marketplace of ideas.  If the 
purpose of the marketplace of ideas is to seek truth, then the 
voices of prisoners are among the most important views to 
consider when discussing prison-related issues.  Just as one 
would want to hear what farmers have to say about agriculture, 
or teachers about education, one would want to know what 
prisoners have to say about the operation of prisons.  For the 
marketplace of ideas to function properly, prisoners must have 
access to it.81
Consider here the racial and economic disparities in the 
prison population, highlighted earlier.
 
82
B. The Checking Value of Free Speech 
  The upshot of these 
disparities, when combined with restrictive prison censorship, is 
that in the aggregate, people who are richer, whiter, and not 
incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to the marketplace of ideas 
than others.  Disparate access will result in a distorted mixture 
of viewpoints in public discourse because demographic factors 
correlate with viewpoints on at least some matters of public 
concern, especially ones involving criminal justice. 
Like the marketplace of ideas theory, the “checking value” 
theory of free expression holds that the First Amendment 
protects the open exchange of ideas, but this theory does not 
conceive of free expression as a means to discover truth.83  In The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, Vincent Blasi 
argued that a central function of the First Amendment is to 
protect the press when it exposes governmental abuses of 
power.84
 
How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 952 n.6 (1997) 
(adding to Ingber’s original list); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 825 n.7 (2008). 
  Blasi advocates for the free flow of information, not 
81 See infra note 88. 
82 See supra notes 60–61, 63 and accompanying text. 
83 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977). 
84 Id. (noting that in the years prior to publishing, “the First Amendment has 
had at least as much impact on American life by facilitating a process by which 
countervailing forces check the misuse of official power as by protecting the dignity 
of the individual, maintaining a diverse society in the face of conformist pressures, 
promoting the quest for scientific and philosophic truth, or fostering a regime of ‘self-
government’ in which large numbers of ordinary citizens take an active part in 
political affairs”). 
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because he believes it will actually lead to truth—he concedes 
this point—but instead because “any governmental intervention 
in the market is likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the 
preexisting distortions.”85
One of the most important functions of prisoners’ speech is to 
expose prison abuses, a matter of public concern.
  Distortion is problematic because it 
dilutes the accountability of those in positions of authority. 
86  But speech 
critical of prison officials also faces a heightened risk of 
censorship, for it is often officers and their colleagues—those who 
hold censoring power—who are being criticized.  In Martinez, for 
example, the regulations at issue prohibited prisoners from 
“magnify[ing] grievances,” and the Supreme Court observed that 
this provision “fairly invited prison officials and employees to 
apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards 
for prisoner mail censorship.”87  “Not surprisingly, some prison 
officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized 
by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism.”88  In other 
words, correctional officers’ biases led them to stifle criticism.89  
Justice Marshall amplified this point in his concurrence, warning 
that “the most obvious victim of the indirect censorship effected 
by a policy of allowing prison authorities to read inmate mail is 
criticism of prison administration.”90
 
85 Id. at 550; see also Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, First Amendment Theories 
and Press Responsibility: The Work of Zechariah Chafee, Thomas Emerson, Vincent 
Blasi and Edwin Baker, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 48, 56 (1992). 
 
86 See generally Victoria Law, Tens of Thousands of California Prisoners Launch 
Mass Hunger Strike, THE NATION (July 10, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article 
/tens-thousands-california-prisoners-launch-mass-hunger-strike/; German Lopez, 
We're in the Midst of the Biggest Prison Strike in U.S. History, VOX (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/10/19/13306178/prison-strike-protests-attica; 
Noelle Crombie, Women Inmates File Second Suit Against State Prison Doctor, THE 
OREGONIAN (Apr. 24, 2017), www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/ 
2017/04/second_lawsuit_filed_against_c.html. 
87 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (“[A]t one institution under the Department’s jurisdiction, the checklist 
used by the mailroom staff authorized rejection of letters ‘criticizing policy, rules or 
officials,’ and the mailroom sergeant stated in a deposition that he would reject as 
‘defamatory’ letters ‘belitting staff or our judicial system or anything connected with 
Department of Corrections.’ Correspondence was also censored for ‘disrespectful 
comments,’ ‘derogatory remarks,’ and the like.”). 
90 Id. at 427 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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Abuses by prison officials increase the importance of 
prisoners’ speech as a check on government power.91  Erwin 
Chemerinsky has observed that in authoritarian institutions 
such as prisons, “there is a great need for judicial protection of 
rights . . . because of the great likelihood of serious rights 
violations.  Indeed, the greater the authority some have over 
others, and the fewer the checks or limits on behavior, the 
greater the chance for abuse.”92  Without prisoners’ speech, 
public information about prisons would come primarily from 
prison officials themselves.93  Speech in prisons is especially 
fragile because limited checks on officials’ behavior increase the 
risk of retaliation.94  In this way, Turner deference diminishes 
the checking value of free speech by granting prison officials free 
reign to censor speech about prison abuses.95
C. Democracy Legitimation 
 
The democracy legitimation theory asserts that free political 
discourse is necessary to democratic decision-making and the 
proper functioning of democratic government.  It follows that 
 
91 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887–89 (2009) (noting the troubling prevalence 
of overcrowding, violence, rape and sexual assault, and inadequate health care in 
correctional facilities); MARGARET NOONAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 
(2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0013st.pdf (noting the increase of 
prisoner deaths); Words from Prison: Sexual Abuse in Prison, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/words-prison-sexual-abuse-prison (last visited June 22, 
2018); Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 80–81 (1973) (demonstrating how power abuses are 
inherent in authoritarian institutions such as prisons). 
92 Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 458. 
93 DAVID M. SHAPIRO, ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND 
MASS INCARCERATION 40–41 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf (“For-profit prison companies go to great 
lengths, and apparently spend significant funds, to put forth a positive public image. 
Certain private prison companies offer the public well-manicured websites with 
extensive press releases and video footage touting their accomplish- 
ments . . . . Private prison companies also funnel money . . . into communications 
departments . . . . Meanwhile, private prison websites rarely report negative 
information: no one would know from [the Corrections Corporation of America]’s 
website that one of its employees sexually abused multiple female immigration 
detainees, or that one of its facilities is allegedly so violent that it has been dubbed 
the ‘gladiator school.’ ”). 
94 See Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 458. 
95 See supra Section I.A. 
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speech related to the governing function is entitled to the 
strongest First Amendment protection.  The democracy 
legitimation theory therefore prizes political speech, or at least 
speech that may impact political or public issues. 
The theory appears in James Madison’s Report on the 
Virginia Resolutions, where he wrote that if either the legislative 
or executive branch failed to “discharge its trust,” the President 
and the legislators “should be brought into contempt or 
disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people,” who should vote 
them out of office.96  This process requires free speech because a 
given official may or may not deserve the public’s contempt—it is 
a question that “can only be determined by a free examination 
thereof, and a free communication among the people thereon.”97
Justice Brandeis argued a similar point in his 1927 
concurrence in Whitney v. California, where he described free 
speech as a means to “political truth”: 
 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and 
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail 
over the arbitrary. . . .  They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.98
The Supreme Court has since recognized Justice Brandeis’ 





96 JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 
4 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, OF THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 574 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott 1866), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s42.html. 
 
97 Id. 
98 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
99 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Whitney, 
274 U.S. at 375–76) (“[Those who won independence for the United States] 
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that 
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it 
is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
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Alexander Meiklejohn similarly argued that the First 
Amendment protects democratic governance.100  The people are 
the governors, and they exercise their governing function in the 
voting booth.101  Properly exercising that function demands a free 
flow of information and opinion.  Speech regarding political or 
public issues is therefore entitled to the highest protection.  
Meiklejohn’s approach to the First Amendment is structural—the 
Amendment is designed to protect “the freedom of those activities 
of thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’ ”102
The democracy legitimation account has appeared in 
scholarship
 
103 as well as Supreme Court cases post-Whitney.  For 
example, in Stromberg v. California, the Court held that “[t]he 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the 
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people 
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an 
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a 
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”104  Likewise, 
in Garrison v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan wrote that “speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.”105
Turner deference compromises the democratic legitimization 
function of free speech by allowing prodigious censorship of 
political discourse.  Turner deference makes no distinction 
 
 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that 
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. 
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed 
silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that 
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”). 
100 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REV. 245, 252 (1961) [hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an 
Absolute]; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 115–18 (1960). 
101 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, supra note 100, at 255. 
102 Id. 
103 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 603, 603 (1990); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986) (“We allow people to speak so others can vote. 
Speech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in 
possession of all the relevant information.”). 
104 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
105 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). For a discussion of the self-
fulfillment theory, see infra Section III.D. 
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between political speech and any other type of speech—it applies 
equally to suppression of books about creating home-made 
shanks and books about the history of socialism.106  Judicial 
deference thus enables prison officials to exclude prisoners from 
political discourse vital to democratic government.  Turner 
deference is further at odds with the democratic legitimation 
theory because the criminal justice system is undoubtedly a 
matter of public concern.  As Justice Stewart wrote in Pell v. 
Procunier, “the conditions in this Nation’s prisons are a matter 
that is both newsworthy and of great public importance.”107
D. Self-Fulfillment 
  
Turner deference, however, severely undercuts the ability of non-
prisoners, and prisoners themselves, to receive information about 
prisons and the penal system. 
The theories described above are “structural” in that they 
view free speech not as an end in itself but as a condition 
necessary for a society to achieve other goals—truth, official 
accountability, democratic governance.  In contrast, the self-
fulfillment theory views the First Amendment as a personal 
right, one that protects individual expression for the sake of 
individual expression. 
Thomas Emerson, the scholar most closely associated with 
the individual self-fulfillment theory of First Amendment, 
concluded that expression was the realization of an individual’s 
own character and potentialities.108
 
106 Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Wald, J., dissenting) 
(“[L]awmakers who believe that books on Russian history may lead to disrespect for 
the United States may ban those books for prisoners; lawmakers who hold pro-life 
views may prevent prisoners from reading publications describing Roe v. Wade; and 
lawmakers who hold an antiquated view of the role women should play in society 
may ban the distribution in prisons of publications with feminist themes. Each of 
these actions could logically be taken in the name of rehabilitation, broadly defined, 
and each, without doubt, would contribute to a continual evisceration of the First 
Amendment rights of prisoners.”). 
  He reasoned that: 
107 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 n.7 (1974). Justice Stewart cited a speech 
by Chief Justice Burger to support the idea that if society “want[s] prisoners to 
change, public attitudes toward prisoners and ex-prisoners must change. . . . A visit 
to most prisons will make you a zealot for prison reform.” Id. (quoting Warren 
Burger, For Whom the Bell Tolls, reprinted at 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. (Supp.) 14, 
20–21 (1970)). 
108 Emerson, supra note 56, at 879–81 (“The right to freedom of expression is 
justified first of all as the right of an individual purely in his capacity as an 
individual. It derives from the widely accepted premise of Western thought that the 
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every man—in the development of his own personality—has the 
right to form his own beliefs and opinions.  And, it also follows, 
that he has the right to express these beliefs and opinions.  
Otherwise they are of little account.  For expression is an 
integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration 
and of the affirmation of self.  The power to realize his 
potentiality as a human being begins at this point and must 
extend at least this far if the whole nature of man is not to be 
thwarted.109
Under this theory, as long as an act of expression serves the 
integral function of allowing humans to find “meaning 
and . . . place in the world,” then it should be free of censorship.
  
110
Like Emerson, C. Edwin Baker argued that the First 
Amendment protects the act of speech for the sake of individual 
development, not the content of speech itself.
 
111  Under this 
theory, “the Constitution should protect all expressive conduct, 
whether or not intended to communicate propositions or 
attitudes to others, that involves individual self-expression or 
attempts at creation, unless the conduct operates coercively, 
physically obstructs others’ activities, or otherwise interferes 
with others’ legitimate decisionmaking authority.”112
The self-fulfillment rationale, like other positive theories of 
free expression, has been invoked in judicial opinions.  Justice 




proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human 
being.”). 
109 Id. at 879. 
110 Id. at 879–80; see also David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: 
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) 
(“The idea here is that people are not to be constrained to communicate or not to 
communicate, to believe or not to believe, to associate or not to associate. The value 
placed on this cluster of ideas derives from the notion of self-respect that comes from 
a mature person's full and untrammelled exercise of capacities central to human 
rationality. . . . Freedom of expression permits and encourages the exercise of these 
capacities: it supports a mature individual's sovereign autonomy in deciding how to 
communicate with others; it disfavors restrictions on communication imposed for the 
sake of the distorting rigidities of the orthodox and the established. In so doing, it 
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.”). 
111 See C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the 
First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 342–43 (1982); see also Hindman, supra 
note 85, at 59 (noting how Baker’s theory differs from theories such as Blasi’s 
checking value, which views the First Amendment as protecting speech because of 
its content). 
112 Baker, supra note 111, at 333. 
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Martinez, which dealt with the censorship of prisoners’ outgoing 
correspondence.  Citing Emerson’s Towards a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, Justice Marshall wrote: 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity 
but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.  Such expression is an integral part of the 
development of ideas and a sense of identity.  To suppress 
expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition 
and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.113
More recently, the rationale of the self-fulfillment theory 
appeared in the case Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
 
114 where 
Justice Kennedy wrote: “The right to think is the beginning of 
freedom, and speech must be protected from the government 
because speech is the beginning of thought.”115
Turner deference compromises the self-fulfillment value of 
free expression.  It grants the government vast power to censor 
prisoners’ speech, and correctional officials have used this power 
to censor literary, scientific, and religious speech in prison.
 
116  
Removing access to these sources of knowledge and inspiration 
dilutes a prisoner’s right to self-fulfillment by hindering the 
ability to draw on external sources when forming his or her own 
beliefs.  While self-fulfillment is not dependent on unlimited 
access to outside information—after all, many prisoners engage 
in self-expression through various artistic, academic, and literary 
avenues despite the Turner standard117
 
113 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(citing Emerson, supra note 56, at 879–80). 
—the degree to which 
prisoners are able to fully engage in self-fulfillment is lessened by 
incoming and internal speech restrictions permitted under 
Turner. 
114 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002). 
115 Id. at 253. 
116 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 995–1005. 
117 See Amy Rutledge, Program Helps Female Inmates with Stress, Self 
Expression, WGN-TV (Mar. 9, 2017), http://wgntv.com/2017/03/09/program-helps-
female-inmates-with-stress-self-expression/; PRISON WRITERS, http://prison 
writers.com (last visited June 22, 2018); THE PRISON ARTS COALITION, 
https://theprisonartscoalition.com (last visited June 22, 2018); J. PRISONERS ON 
PRISONS, http://www.jpp.org (last visited June 22, 2018). 
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CONCLUSION 
Turner deference depends on the assumption that judicial 
meddling in prison affairs will compromise prison order and 
security.118  One of us has argued previously that this concern is 
overblown—and the best evidence is the fact that heightened 
statutory protections for prisoners’ religious exercise have not 
unleashed violence and disorder, which makes it doubtful that 
increased protections of prisoners’ non-religious expression would 
have widespread negative effects.119
Not only are the benefits of deference to prison censorship 
limited, but, as this Article has shown, the costs of deference are 
quite severe.  Speech by prisoners is vital to the American system 
of free expression, yet the current legal regime fails to accord 
such speech the protection it deserves.  The extreme deference 
accorded prison officials by Turner and its progeny enables 
censorship that compromises the core functions of the First 
Amendment.  Turner deference does not merely impact 
individual prisoners; it threatens the legitimacy of our system of 
free expression by encouraging unwarranted and insurmountable 
obstacles to speech for a large segment of the American 
population. 
  When it comes to 
restrictions on expressive activities, the benefits of deference to 
prison authorities appear to be overstated. 
 
 
118 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987). 
119 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1021–23 (noting that the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act command 
courts to apply strict scrutiny to substantial burdens on prisoners’ religious rights). 
